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UNIVERSITITEKNOLOGI MARA (UiTM) 
An Introduction 
Universiti Teknologi MARA (formerly known as MARA Institute of Technology) 
is Malaysia's largest institution of higher learning. It had its beginnings in 1956 as 
Dewan Latihan RID A, a training centre under the supervision of the Rural Industrial 
Development Authority (RIDA). 
Nine years later Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) Act, 1965 provided for a change 
of name from Dewan Latihan RIDA to Maktab MARA (MARA College). The Act 
also defined a new role for the MARA College - to train Bumiputras (literally it 
means "the sons of the soil" - ie the indigenous people) to be professionals and 
semi-professionals in order to enable them to become equal partners with other 
ethnic groups (ie the former migrants, especially the Chinese and Indians) in the 
commercial and industrial enterprises of the nation. 
In 1967 Maktab MARA was renamed Institut Teknologi MARA(ITM) (or MARA 
Institute of Technology). In August 1999, the Institute was upgraded to university 
status and named Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM). 
As pan of the government's affirmative action policies, UiTM provides education 
and training in a wide range of sciences, technology, business management and 
professional courses to 56,408 full-time students in 2000. Another 3,156 have 
enrolled for off-campus courses. In addition, there are 7,725 students in distance-
learning and flexible-learning programmes. 
The main campus stands on a 150-hectare piece of land on a picturesque hilly area 
of Shah Alam, the state capital of Selangor Darul Ehsan, about 24 kilometres from 
the city of Kuala Lumpur. 
The Universiti has also established branch campuses in the various states of the 
Federation: Sabah (1973), Sarawak(1973), Perlis (1974), Terengganu (1975), Johor 
(1984), Melaka (1984), Pahang (1985), Perak (1985), Kelantan (1985), Penang 
(1996), Kedah (1997) and Negeri Sembilan (1999). 
The Universiti currently offers 184 programmes conducted by 18 Faculties. These 
programmes range from post-graduate to pre-diploma or certificate levels. More 
than half of these are undergraduate and post-graduate programmes, while diploma 
programmes account for an additional 39%. Some of the post-graduate programmes 
are undertaken in the form of twinning programmes, through collaboration with 
universities based overseas. 
The following 18 Faculties currently run programmes in the University: 
Accountancy; Administration and Law; Applied Science; Architecture Planning & 
Surveying; Art & Design; Business & Management; Civil Engineering; Education; 
Electrical Engineering; Hotel & Tourism Management; Information Technology 
& Quantitative Science; Mass Communication; Mechanical Engineering; Office 
Management & Technology; Performing Arts; Science; Sport Science & Recreation. 
In addition to faculties there are 17 'academic centres' to cater various academic, 
business, technological and religious needs of the campus community. They are 
Extension Education Centre (PPL); Language Centre; Centre for Preparatory 
Education; Resource Centre for Teaching and Learning; Total Quality in UiTM 
(CTQE); Department of Academic Quality Assurance & Evaluation; Computer 
Aided Design Engineering Manufacturing (CADEM); Malaysian Centre for 
Transport Studies (MACTRANS); Text Preparation Bureau; Bureau of Research 
& Consultancy; Malaysian Entrepreneurship Development Centre (MEDEC); 
Islamic Education Centre; Centre for Integrated Islamic Services; Business & 
Technology Transfer Centre. 
THE FACULTY OF ADMINISTRATION AND LAW, UiTM 
The Faculty of Administration and Law (formerly known as the School of 
Administration and Law) was founded in 1968. It began as a centre offering British 
external programmes, the LLB (London - External) and the Chartered Institute of 
Secretaries (now Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators). The only 
internal programme offered then was the Diploma in Public Administration and 
Local Government (DPALG). In 1978 the LLB (London - External) programme 
was terminated and replaced by the current internal LLB programme. The LLB is 
a three-year academic degree course based on the structure of the undergraduate 
law programmes normally offered in the British universities. Unlike most of the 
British LLB programmes, however, the LLB at the Faculty is conducted on a 
semester system. In 1982 the Faculty introduced a one-year LLB (Hons) programme 
towards which graduates of the LLB could advance their studies. The LLB (Hons) 
is a professional and practice-oriented programme that provides training to students 
for their career in the legal practice as Advocates and Solicitors. The delivery of 
the curriculum for this course adopts the method and strategy of simulated or 
experiential learning. Because of the unique experience it provides to students in 
their legal training this course has acquired wide recognition and acceptance among 
the Malaysian public. 
The Faculty of Administration and Law enjoys strong connections with the legal 
profession, particularly the Malaysian Bar, and the industry. It takes pride in 
continually developing pioneering options in its degree programmes, both at the 
academic and professional levels. In 1995 the Faculty introduced the degree of 
Bachelor in Corporate Administration (Hons) to train young and bright Malaysians 
to hold office as Company Secretaries. In the pipe-line are some new courses -
Bachelor of Law and Management (Hons), Bachelor of Administrative Science 
(Hons), Masters of Law and Executive Masters in Administrative Science. 
The Faculty currently comprises some 70 academic staff from both the disciplines 
of law and administration. It has about 600 students reading for the LLB and LLB 
(Hons) and 500 students reading for the Diploma in Public Administration and 
Bachelor in Corporate Administraiion (Hons). The Faculty admits about 200 
students each year. 
Main Entrance to Shah Alam Campus 
EDITORIAL NOTES 
This law journal had a long period of gestation in the Faculty. There were several 
attempts in the past, by individuals or the faculty collectively, to bring about its 
parturition. It is no easy task to initiate an academic journal, regardless of the 
discipline it represents. It demands a high degree of commitment in time, energy 
and attention. It calls for an intense love of labour for scholarship among a critical 
mass of the faculty members, either in the editorial board or as article contributors. 
But, at long last, this journal has arrived. 
Many factors led to this successful launch. The recent elevation of this institution 
to university status created its own impetus. Our strong law programme and its 
capable teachers demanded, and will benefit from, this specialist forum for aca-
demic debate and analysis. There is support within the legal profession and among 
our many distinguished alumni for such a journal, too. We are delighted by the 
synergy and collaborative goodwill the notion of a journal has evoked. So, we 
were able to marshal much expertise and experience to bring out this inaugural 
issue of the Journal. 
Academic faculty at UiTM are part of the worldwide network of academia. We 
must participate in discussions and debates over issues that are not only of direct 
academic and professional concern but also of importance to the general public. A 
journal such as this facilitates reflective and disciplined participation. In doing so, 
it helps the Faculty, and the University, to undertake its noble role in serving the 
general community. 
A learned journal is one of the major measures by which the weight and prestige of 
an institution are judged. It reflects the institution's maturity and ability to manage 
and conduct its specialist discipline. It reflects a confidence among its faculty to 
offer themselves to be evaluated in the open market place of ideas, and it serves 
notice of the faculty's readiness to serve the community at large. This Journal, in 
no small measure, marks the coming of age of the Faculty. 
The Journal functions also as a meeting point for law teachers and practitioners 
who share a common interest in various areas of law. It provides them a source of 
information on the current and topical issues in their specialised areas. It creates a 
forum for the exchange of ideas and for engaging in discourse over sometimes 
intricate and often vexed legal issues. Much is gained by the legal fraternity, as 
well as the legal system, through such engagements and encounters. 
Law teachers, as members of the broader academic community, are aware that it is 
no longer tenable for them to function solely within their traditional ivory towers, 
isolated from the reality of the world outside. For career and professional advance-
ment, and for taking their rightful role in the community, no academic can confine 
herself to her classroom or departmental audience. She must reach for a wider 
audience. The recognition (or lack of it) that she gains from her peers, both within 
and without the discipline, will speak for her standing and credibility in the com-
munity, both scholarly and otherwise. This Journal will serve as one channel for 
the Faculty members to reach that wider audience. 
There are relatively few academic legal journals in this country. Most existing 
legal publications cater for the professional needs of legal practitioners. One rami-
fication of this is that there are few discourses on theoretical and abstract legal 
issues. Yet these issues are important for the fuller appreciation and development 
of the law and the legal system, by the legislature, the reform bodies and the courts. 
This Journal will try to answer this need and stimulate discussions on issues that 
are of interest and relevance to the academic and broader communities. 
The labour and skill required for this Journal to thrive will challenge the staff of 
the institution and the supporters of this initiative among the profession and the 
wider community. We hope the Journal sails well in fair winds. 
Our wish is that Malaysia's legal profession, its legal academic circle and the many 
students and practitioners of law in this country and elsewhere will benefit from 
this forum for analysis and reform. We hope this Journal makes an important con-
tribution to debate on vital legal matters in our society. We hope, too, that our quest 
for self-expression and critical reflection among the members of the legal academia 
will be assisted by this Journal. It is with great pleasure and some satisfaction at 
the completion of this worthy task that we complete this inaugural Editorial. 
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ARTICLES 
THE ONTOLOGICAL QUESTION IN THE 
INSTRUMENTALIST CONCEPTION OF LAW 
by MOHD DARBI BIN HASHIM* 
The Star, a local newspaper, on 2 October 1993 carried the following report: 
Addressing the US-Asean Business Council dinner here on Thursday night, Dr. 
Mahathir said Malaysia's [development] strategy combined economic, social, legal, 
labour and educational tools. 
The particular point in question which the report has raised and which will be 
taken up for discussion in this article is the evident realization at the highest level 
by the country's powers-that-be regarding law's efficacy as a tool or instrument 
for development and economic policy. In Malaysia such a view toward law is 
rather unconventional, because the general attitude among legal practitioners and 
lay public alike is that law is no more than a means of social control for the 
preservation of the social order and a framework for "conflict amelioration". 
At the scholarly level such legal fields of studies as "law and development" and 
"the political economy of law" remain unexplored and unexamined. Although such 
fields have been widely deliberated upon and researched by legal academics in 
African and Latin American countries, they have received cursory attention in 
local legal discourse. Similarly they are marginalized in the legal education curricula 
and in universities and colleges, which are heavily inundated with "bread-and-
butter" subjects oriented toward professional practice. 
What further makes Mahathir's view unconventional is its removal of law from its 
apparent isolation and locating it in the socio-economic agenda of the society. 
Such a conception of law goes against the grain of the common law legal tradition. 
Its characteristic feature is to treat law as an isolated phenomenon, divorced from 
the social experience out of which it emerges in the first place. As such, law is 
* Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Administration and Law, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia, Bar-at-
Law (Lincoln's Inn), M.A, (Business Law), LL.B. (Lond). 
This article was prepared in 1993. Because of unavoidable circumstances, it failed to find a place on printed pages. 
Despite the long passage of time, the writer believes that the theoretical problematic it raises remains current. On 
Tuesday 3 January 1999, The Slar newspaper carried the following report:"Beijing: China's law makers will deliberate 
89 new or revised laws over the next four years as the nation rushes to create a legal system that can cope with its swift 
economic reforms. On the agenda with the standing committee of the National People's Congress <NPC) is legislation 
as diverse as contract and air pollution control..." 
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viewed as a self-sufficient category which is capable of being understood and 
explained within its own internal logic and dynamic. Hence law's inter-
connectedness with other factors in society - politics, economy, religion, culture 
and education - is overlooked and law's status as a social construct ignored. Instead 
law's doctrinal aspects are markedly and repeatedly emphasised (by judges, lawyers, 
academicians and students) thus leaving its ideological, legitimating, hegemonic, 
mystifying and repressive aspects and functions unarticulated and unquestioned. 
Despite the apparent social orientation in this conception of law it nevertheless 
represents a characteristically instrumentalist' orpurposive view of the phenomenon. 
This is the view which essentially and narrowly conceives law as a precision tool 
of state and government. Hence law is believed to possess a transformative capacity 
on social order and institutions. It can be deployed "to restructure or plan economic 
enterprise on a massive scale, to promote peaceful revolution in social relations... 
and to shape attitude and beliefs."2 In the context of a development programme 
which relies heavily on private entrepreneurial initiatives and capital, lawis task 
becomes one of providing and creating an hospitable climate in which to stimulate 
and facilitate private investments. This is accomplished through such steps as the 
provision of easy tax law, an educated work force, research institutes, "law and 
order", well-developed infrastructure, the drawing of clear demarcation lines 
between administrative power and individual rights, and the suppression of 
corruption and the collection of taxes. 
Within an economic development model with emphasis on egalitarian distribution 
of resources and wealth, on the other hand, lawis instrumentality is seen in doing 
whatever is necessary to remove institutional barriers to development in society, 
restructuring inequitable relationships, finding solutions for equitable shareouts of 
incomes and providing mechanisms for greater participation in decision making 
by wage earners and peasants. 
It is, however, not the aim of this article to compare the merits of the two economic 
models. Neither is its objective to identify which of the two models best describes 
the development path on which Malaysia is presently embarking. Nor to assess the 
efficacy of law's instrumentality in "social engineering" task. What it seeks to 
venture instead is to examine the ontological premise upon which the instrumentalist 
conception of law stands. 
Implicit in the instrumentalist conception of law is the theoretical standpoint 
regarding law's separatedness from the society it regulates, its apparent autonomy 
within social life, such that it "becomes possible to conceive law as standing apart 
1. The term "instrumentalist" i& used here in a sense different from that referring to a strand in Marxist thinking 
of law where it is viewed as an instrument of the ruling class in society to suppress the working class. 
2. RCotterrell, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction (Bullerworlhs London 1984)48. 
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and in some way acting upon society instead of being an aspect of it". Law from 
such a perspective thus has become (or can be) somehow freed from its social and 
cultural roots. A corollary idea which develops from such a theoretical standpoint 
is that law can be deliberately and consciously used as a tool to change patterns of 
social life in a massive scale; a mechanism of purposeful government. 
Such a conception of law that endows upon it an existence set apart from all other 
individual and social forces, however, raises serious theoretical problems. This is 
because, as a social phenomenon, it is inconceivable that law will ever gain an 
existence independent of the society in which it exists. An early rejection of any 
notion of law's autonomy can be found in the "determinist" approach to law of the 
Marxist tradition. This theory posits a relationship between the economic sphere 
and the "superstructure" in society. The economy consists of relations of production 
(which are regarded as the most basic of social relations) together with the productive 
forces - that is, the means of production (material, labour, machine, etc) labour 
resources and conditions of production including the level of technological 
development. Upon this economic "base" a superstructure arises, ultimately 
"determined" by the economic structure. The superstructure consists of the legal, 
political, ethical, ideological and philosophical spheres of social life. The following 
well-known excerpt from Marx's writing is often used to base the claim. 
In the social production of their life men enter into definite relations that are 
indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond 
to a definite stage of development of their productive forces. The sum total of these 
relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond 
definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life 
conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social 
being that determines their consciousness.' 
The extreme determinist reading of this statement would suggest that the agenda, 
form and content of law are directly derived from the economic relations of 
production.'1 The metaphor of "reflection" is used to characterise the point. As 
Collins points out, 
The key [to Marxist analysis of law] was found in the base and superstructure idea. 
It was said that law was a reflection of the economic base; the forms and contents 
of law correspond to the dominant mode of production.' 
3 Karl Man cited in Y Ghai, R Luckman and R Snyder <eds), The Political Economy of Law, A Third World 
Reader (Oxford University Press Delhi 19S7) 40. 
4 KS Newman, Law & Economic Organisation (Cambridge University Press 1983) 17. 
5 H Collins, Marxism and Law (Oxford University press 1982)23. 
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Again as others have stated, 
The Marxist view of the state and law that became fashionable thus regarded both 
as mere reflections of the economy through repression but without autonomy of 
their own, either from the economy or the ruling class.^  
Law in the determinist matrix thus appears as ancillary to economic relations, 
indeed derivative of them. "It is conceived as lacking in autonomy and, therefore, 
for example, in any social engineering potential,,, law follows and never leads."7 
Ex hypothesi it is untenable to speak of law capable of transforming the social 
condition within which it stands. 
Some Marxists, however, have rejected such a mode of analysis of law as being 
either "reductionist", "economistic" or "mechanistic". But such criticisms do not 
go to refute law's autonomy from its social foundation in the manner suggested by 
the instrumentalist conception. The hub of the criticism instead highlights the failure 
of such a deterministic explanation of law to account for human agency, 
consciousness and volition for independent action and choice in law's social drama. 
Certainly, it is pointed out, people cannot be assumed to conform "to the mysterious 
constraints imposed by the material base without seriously refuting the contrary 
view that men are free to determine their own goals and act accordingly,"8 Further, 
it is argued, a more elaborate analysis of base and superstructure is called for than 
appears in the "deceptively simple passage" from Marx which had been cited. And 
this is most proper "for, to put it at its most obvious, why did Marx and Engels 
write so voluminously if ideas were incapable of changing the world?"9 And Engels 
admits as much: "Why do we fight for the political dictatorship of the proletariat if 
political power is economically impotent?"10 
Diverging from the determinist or reductionist reading of Marx, this strand in 
Marxist tradition advances the view that rather than determinism being a 
unidirectional phenomenon, it posits a dialectical relationship such that law (and 
other superstructural constructs) can influence the economic base, and that "law 
moulds social development" too. Thus, for instance, 
a modem statute designed to penalize and deter the pollution of rivers is the product 
of considerable argument and debates motivated by groups who want to alter the 
practices of manufacturing industries. Such a law alters the relations of production 
to the extent that factories will have to make alternative production arrangements 
to avoid polluting activities. In what sense can this deliberate attempt to change a 
6 Y Ghai, above n 3 at 178. 
7 Lloyd and Freeman, itds). Llyod's Introduction to Jurisprudence (Stevens & Sons Ltd 1985)959, 
S H Collins, above n 5 at 25 
9 Lloyd and Freeman, above n 7 at 960. 
10 Ibidat%0-961. 
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minor aspect of the relations of production be described as a reflection of that material 
base?11 
Further, it is asserted, superstnictural institutions (law, politics, ideology and other 
phenomena) exist in reciprocal interaction. "Each has a certain influence on the 
others, but retains a degree of independence.*"2 
Support for the foregoing interpretation of Marx's statement could be found, it is 
argued, in Engels' letter to Bloch, where it was said, 
According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining factor 
in history is the production and reproduction of real life... If someone twists this 
into saying that the economic factor is the only determining one, he transforms that 
proposition into a meaningless abstract phrase. The economic situation is the basis, 
but the various elements of the superstructure... such as constitutions... juridical 
forms... political, legal, philosophical theories... also exercise their influence... 
There is an interaction of all these elements in which... the economic movement is 
finally bound to assert itself.13 
Whichever reading of Marx and Engels represents the "authentic" Marxian analysis 
of law and legal phenomenon, it is obvious that the Marxian paradigm, as it was 
originally articulated, posits a strong relation between law and economy.14 Neither 
strand in Marxism recognizes law as having acquired an independent and separate 
realm of existence in the way it has been comprehended by instrumentalism. 
The assertion of law's lack of autonomy had also been raised outside the Marxist 
circle. We shall begin by taking up the views of William Graham Summer, an 
American sociologist. 
In his classic work Folkways15 Sumner enjoins that law grows, or should grow out 
of the "mores". It shades into them. Folkways and mores change gradually as the 
conditions of life change, but there is little scope for changing them fundamentally 
through any conscious act of legislation. 
Acts of legislation come out of the mores... Legislation... has to seek standing 
ground on the existing mores, and it soon becomes apparent that legislation, to be 
strong, must be consistent with the mores.16 
11 H Collins, above n 5 al 25. 
12 KS Newman, above n i at IS. 
S3 Friedrich Engels cited, ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 WC Sumner, Folkways and Mores (Schockea Books New York 1979). 
16 Ibid at 55. 
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Social life, for Sumner, thus has a dynamic of its own. Law, philosophy, religion, 
and morality (the "superstructure" in Marxist terminology) have no independent 
existence except as various projections of the dynamic. 'They are deeply rooted in 
the process of social development yet virtually powerless to alter them."17 
Despite the unequivocal insistence on law's inseparable link with social life, Sumner, 
unlike the above-mentioned Marxist position, does not discount law's potentiality, 
particularly through legislation, to break away and act independently of the social 
base. However, he does caution that such a course can lead law onto a dangerous 
and risky path. 
Legislation can and does diverge from the mores and to the extent that this occurs 
it threatens to become divorced from the sources of its authority and potentially 
ineffective.13 
In essence, thus, while the instrumentalist perspective posits law "at the centre of 
things", in Sumner's "massive picture of human history" law is clearly peripheral, 
a dependent variable, a sideshow in the main drama of social development. Its 
social significance is not a given, but depends on social conditions which vary in 
different stages of social development in different societies and which law itself 
has little power to shape, "Accordingly whenever law seeks to change society the 
very idea itself is a derivative of the subterranean social forces."'* 
On the European continent, among the most piquant criticisms of the notion of law 
"as merely technical regulation" came from the German conservative statesman 
and jurist, Frederick Karl von Savigny. Savigny insisted that "a legal system was 
part of the culture of a people", and found an especial abhorrence in the codification 
of law (a trend which was fast emerging in Europe in nineteenth century, particularly 
in France). To Savigny such a move was disastrous, primarily because "it sought 
to fix in immutable principal legal ideas which, as an expression of culture, should 
be allowed to develop spontaneously."20 Whenever legal innovation through 
legislation ignored "the social root of law" and sought to fix legal doctrine in a 
comprehensive conceptual system, it only lead to "atrophying" the natural processes 
of change in social rules. 
The basis of Savigny's opposition to legislative activities lies in his belief that law 
is an expression, one of the most important expressions together with language, of 
the "spirit of the people" (Volkgeist). Central to this idea is the notion that law is 
much more than an ensemble of rules and judicial precedents. It is a reflection and 
17 RCotterrell,aboven2iu2]. 
IS Ibid. 
19 Ibid at 22. 
2f) Ibid at 23. 
124 
ONTOLOGICALQUESTION IN THE INSTRUMENTALIST 
CONCEPTION OF LAW 
expression of a whole cultural outlook of the collective life. As Cotterrell 
commented, 
The spirit of a nation or people is the encapsulation of its whole history, the collective 
experience of the social group extending back through the ages of its existence... 
For Savingny, law is incomprehensible as a social phenomenon except in the 
perspective of the history of the society in which it exists.21 
However, like Sumner, Savigny did not totally dismiss the possibility of law being 
subject to conscious and rational creation and development through legislative 
activities. This can happen, and perhaps is necessary, in progressive societies where 
idi vision of functions becomes more clear cut among its members and development 
of classes and sub-groups, becomes more pronounced "such that the volkgeist 
becomes progressively less identifiable and capable of finding ispontaneous 
expression through law".22 But even in such circumstances, Savigny argued, 
conscious legislative process should be confined only to removing doubts and 
uncertainties in evolving law and enacting settled customary law. At no time should 
it deny "the evolutionary nature of law by setting out fixed, final and comprehensive 
principle"." With such caution, Savigny hoped to be able to restore law within the 
life of society. 
Eugene Ehrlich, an eminent and prolific Austrian law professor also made an early 
critique of the autonomy of law. For Erhlich, law is derived from social facts and 
depends not on state authority. In his view, law differs little from other forms of 
social compulsion, and the state is merely one among many associations, though 
admittedly it possesses certain characteristic means of compulsion. The real source 
of law is thus not statutes or judicial decisions reported in case reports but the 
activities of social life. There is what he terms a "living law" underlying the formal 
rules of the legal system and the task of judge and jurist is to integrate the two 
types of law. It is this living law, which furnishes the rules actually followed in 
social life and which generally, operates to prevent disputes. When disputes arise, 
it settles them without recourse to the legal institutions of the state, for the "centre 
of legal gravity lies,., in society itself'.24 For Erhlich, thus, legislation - the state-
law - plays only a marginal role as a "formulative factor in law". However, like 
the two preceding views, there appears in Erhlich's argument a tacit recognition of 
lawis autonomous status in society. This can be drawn from his formulation of the 
dichotomy between the living law and formal law. As the former is rooted in the 
social life of society, the latter, by implication, must be external to it. But for Erhlich, 
despite the autonomy of the formal law, its connection with the social life is not 
21 ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Lloyd and Freeman, above n 2 al 562. 
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lost, as legislators and jurists have the task of adjusting the formal law to match the 
living law. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing sociological and juridical invocations regarding 
lawfs rootedness in social life, there prevails a cognition that law is an autonomous 
phenomenon, a reality sui generis (to borrow Durkheim's terminology), at the free 
disposal of lawyers, judges, legislators and state planners alike. Such cognitive 
experience predominates both the "common sense" perception as well as legal 
postulations and discourses. Cotterrell, for instance, points out, 
[I]n the lawyers' view and in the wider public view [law] has come to be seen as 
separate from the society it regulates. It has become possible to talk about law 
acting upon society, rather than law as an aspect of society. It appears autonomous 
within society.15 
Despite the occasional avowal on the connection between law and the socio-
economic basis, its "determining" aspect, its capacity to act upon and mould society, 
free from its cultural and normative constraints, remains prodigiously emphasised. 
Hartwell thus states, "legal institutions have some autonomy of their own which, 
in varying degrees, makes them exogenous variables in any process of economic 
change."26 Horwitz also puts the argument that there was a radical break with pre-
capitalist society and its law after 1790, and that in the period 1790-1880 the 
American courts "engineered the facilitation and legitimization of industrial 
capitalism."27 
At the forefront of the intellectual validation of the autonomy of law and legal 
doctrines, and hence their important derivative, the instrumentality of law, is the 
normative legal theory, particularly its positivistic variant based on the writings of 
the English legal reformer, Jeremy Bentham, and his more professionally orthodox 
follower, John Austin. Legal positivism posits that laws are the command of the 
sovereign - the supreme legal authority of an independent political society -
typically expressed through legislation and supported by state sanction. Judges are 
the mouthpieces of the sovereign, their powers of law creation existing only by 
delegation from sovereign authority.25 Notwithstanding the later refinement and 
elaboration of this normative theory, its general thrust remains clear: "all law derives 
directly or indirectly from the state, that is, from the supreme political authority of 
a politically organized society." M Under legal positivism law thus becomes "a 
distinct realm of knowledge and practice" - "purified" of ethical, social, political, 
scientific and historical considerations. 
25 R Cotterrell, above n 2 at 48. 
26 Lloyd and Freeman, above n 7 at 963. 
11 Ibid. 
28 R Cotterrell, above n 2 at 28. 
29 ibid. 
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Within the sociological tradition the most elaborate refutation against any attempt 
to explain law as a direct outcome of economic forces was raised by Max Weber, a 
prominent German sociologist, in the course of his "debate with the ghost of Marx". 
Weber preferred to account a larger variety of forces (economic, organizational, 
political and ideological) acting to shape and constrain law.30 In his words, 
"economic situations do not automatically give birth to new legal forms; they merely 
provide the opportunity for the spread of a legal technique if it is invented."31 
Further he adds, "the development of the legal structure of organization has by no 
means been predominantly determined by economic factors."31 And elsewhere he 
states "law evolves at least in part from the momentum of its own internal logic."33 
Recognizing law's autonomous existence, Weber proceeds to provide a definition 
of law, which is unmistakably positivistic. 
An order will be called.., law if it is externally guaranteed by the probability that 
physical or psychological coercion will be applied by a staff of people in order to 
bring about compliance or avenge violation.34 
Despite the claim on law's autonomy in their systems, both positivism and the 
Weberian sociology of law do not provide an explanation to the basic question; 
"how is law's autonomy possible?" In my view, this is the failure of the two theories. 
In other words, the independent status of law is never explicated in both legal 
theories. Law's externality is taken for granted, a given. Law is a self-evident 
entity which acquires an autonomous reality simply on the basis of its definition. 
The reality of law is explained in the very process of fixing the meaning of legal 
ideas.35 As such the ontological status of law in both of the theories remains 
problematic. 
How then is the dichotomy between law's rootedness in social conditions, on the 
one hand, and its apparent autonomy from it, on the other, to be explained? For 
this inquiry, it is suggested that recourse be had to "the exchange theory of law", 
which theory represents so far as the most theoretically informed attempt to explain 
this legal phenomenon. The central precept of this legal theory is that law is 
autonomous only "in form" while in essence and content it is very much embedded 
in social relations, particularly in society's relations of production. So an adequate 
theory of law cannot begin by examining abstract concepts and ideas such as 
"equality", "right" and "duties" because to adopt this approach would only conceal 
the dynamics which give rise to the very concepts themselves. Pashukanis, 
elaborating on the definition of law, noted that "law as a form, does not exist in the 
30 KS Newman, above n 3 at 26 
31 M Rheinsiein, Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (A Clarion Book ]954) 131. 
32 D Milovanovic, Weberian and Marxian Analysis of Law (Avebury 1989)3. 
33 KS Newman, above n 3 at 26. 
34 Max Weber cited in D Milovanovic, above n 32 at 22. 
35 R Cotlerrell cited in Lloyd and Freeman, above n 7 at 667. 
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heads of the theorists or learned jurists. It has a parallel, real history which unfolds 
not as a set of ideas, but as a specific set of relations which men enter into not by 
conscious choice, but because the relations of production compel them to do so."3* 
The process through which law transforms into a "supra-historical force" is, 
according to exchange theory, the distinct feature of the commodity relations in 
capitalist society. 
In capitalism, social relations appear as the relations of free and equal individuals; 
they are not directly relations of power of force as in pre-capitalist societies, such 
as slave orfeudal societies, where they took the form of some sort of social hierarchy. 
The government of such a society could consist of commands passed through the 
hierarchy.37 In a society where such relations of power were lacking "solidaristic 
groups" instead emerged which took decisions, regarding social order according 
to some kind of basic collective process. By their nature, such groups would take 
into consideration the different status of the groups such as elders, women, etc. 
What is important here is that in either of these (pre-capitalist) models, the legal 
and political order of the society remained embedded in its social and economic 
structure. It is under capitalism that a legal order (as well as the political) emerges 
which appears as autonomous and supra historical,35 How is this explained? 
Exchange theory proceeds from the assertion that one of the most important 
characteristics of capitalism is that creative human processes are seen in terms of 
commodities. Everything can be bought and sold and so is understood in term of 
its commodity value. Social relations themselves become, paradoxically, relations 
between things.39 Balbus thus commented: "in [the] capitalist mode of production 
0 the exchange of commodities is paralleled by the exchange of citizens."*5 
What this implies is that under capitalist social relations individuals relate to one 
another as property owners, that is, in terms of the commodities they hold or around 
which their dealings are organized. Thus they are brought together as "employers", 
"consumers", "neighbours" because they buy and sell objects. Such a feature of 
social life is of paramount ideological importance to the system, since capitalism 
depends on the freedom of market transactions. These transactions include, most 
fundamentally, those embodied in the relations of production in which human 
labour-power itself is seen as a commodity (which is a rather unique commodity) 
to be exchanged in the market. Hence the reason why in a capitalist system the 
capitalist can retain all the profits (surplus value) from another man's labour is 
36 Evgeny B Pashukanis cited in D Milovanovic, above n 32 at 24. 
37 Sol Piccioiio, "The Theory of the Stale, Class Struggle and the Rule of Law", in B Fine, R Kinsey, J Lea, S 
Picciotto and J Young (eds), Capitalism ami the Rule of law (Hutchinson of London 1979) 166, 
38 Ibid. 
39 RCotterrell,aboven2at 123. 
40 ID Balbus, "Commodity Form and Legal Form: an Essay on the Relative Autonomy of the Law", in CE 
Reasons and RM Rich (eds). The Sociology of Law. A Conflict Perspective (Butterworths Toronto 1978) 77. 
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precisely because he has bought, in a freely negotiated contract, the worker's labour 
power and "so holds it and its fruits as his own". 
Such production relations eventually assert themselves in juridical concepts and 
ideas. "Production relations", Marx points out, "are bound to be expressed as 
political and legal relations."41 Hence in a capitalist society the legal form is but 
"the direct analogy and necessary fulfillment of commodity forms". To borrow the 
term from Balbus, a "homology" is created between the legal form and commodity 
form.4* At the heart of law is found the concept of the universal legal "subject", 
which in the commodity exchange transaction "figures for the first time in all the 
fullness of its definitions."43 The rights and duties of individual legal subjects are 
equal before the law and "whatever the real economic and social differences between 
individuals, capitalist law tends towards the idea that all are equal in its eyes". The 
special determinant of legal status based on property, race, gender or other 
qualifications tend gradually to disappear with the development of the law. The 
application of the law may greatly discriminate between classes and groups, but 
on its face - in legal doctrines and legal ideology - capitalist law tends to treat all 
as equal, so disregarding the status of real or substantive inequality which it 
maintains.44 In other words, under capitalism legal relations take place in forms 
which conceal "the qualitatively different interests and social origins of 
individuals".4i However, the universal legal subject is recognized by law as free 
and equal only insofar as he can be seen as a property owner. He owns, at the very 
least, his faculties and his power to work which under capitalism is a commodity. 
This commodity, if no other, he can avail to the market. Thus under capitalism 
legal relations are fundamentally the relations of commodity owners in the market.'16 
Law is bom with the market, reaches its highest and most abstract form in capitalism, 
where all social relations are dominated by commodity form. People's actual 
relationships are hence not immediately social but, due to the domination of 
commodity production, they are mediated by the exchange of commodities. They 
appear as fetishised form. More specifically, relations existing in the society are 
given "idealized expression" in the form of concepts, ideas, etc. Balbus points out 
that it is precisely such fetishism under capitalism that allows for formalist 
conceptualization of law as "autonomous" reality to be explained according to its 
own "internal dynamics", where it is conceived as an independent subject, on whose 
creativity the survival of the society instead depends. The ramification this has for 
individuals is that there develops in their consciousness an affirmation that they 
owe their existence to the law, rather than the reverse, "inverting" the real causal 
relationship between themselves and their product. Consequently, they are 
41 Karl Marx cited in D Milovanovic, above n 32 at 2 1 
42 ID Balbus, above n 40 at 77. 
43 EvgenyB Pashukanis cited in P Fitzpairick, Law and Stale in Papua New Guinea (Academic Press 1980) 25. 
44 R Cotterrell, above n 2 at 12. 
45 ID Balbus, above n 40 at 78. 
46 R Cotterrell, above n 2 at 124. 
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precluded from the possibility of evaluating the legal form, an entity that is 
conceived as an independent source of one's existence and values."' "It is in this 
sense," points out Milovanovic, "that lawyers uphold the status quo by merely 
accepting, uncritically the logical expressions emanating from existing relations 
of production"."8 
The foregoing views, which have been expressed by modern critical writers, are 
reminiscent of what Marx had stated very much earlier. Production relations, he 
points out, 
are bound to acquire an independent existence over against the individuals. All 
relations can be expressed in language only in the form of concepts. That these 
general ideas and concepts are looked upon as mysterious forces is the necessary 
result of the fact that the real relations of which they are the expression, have acquired 
independent existence.,. these general ideas are further elaborated and given a special 
significance by politicians and lawyers, who, as a result of the division of labor, are 
dependent on the cult of these concepts, and who see in them, and not in the relations 
of production, the true basis of all property relations.4* 
Elsewhere Marx also argues that in consciousness - in jurisprudence, politics, etc, 
- relations become concepts; since they do not go beyond these relations, the 
concepts of the relations also become fixed concepts in their mind.50 Thus in Balbus' 
words, "commodity fetishism and legal fetishism are... two inseparably related 
aspects ofan inverted,'topsy-turvy'existence under acapitalist mode of production 
in which humans are first reduced to abstractions, and then dominated by their 
own creation".51 
So far the discussion in this article centres on law's apparent autonomy in social 
life, and recourse is made to the exchange theory of law for the explanation of the 
phenomenon. What remains sequentially to be explained is the process through 
which law is capable of being conceived as an independent instrument or tool of 
social control, "an efficacious instrument of economic policy". In other words, the 
point to be clarified is; how is law, which is an idealized expression of the existing 
relations in society, capable of acting back on to the society? 
Cotterrell proffers that this phenomenon can be understood as an aspect of the 
apparent autonomy of modern state from the society in which it exists.52 State in 
this context is taken to mean the specifically political elements of organization of 
society. In modern societies these elements tend to become increasingly concentrated 
47 ID Balbus, above n 40 at 84. 
48 D Milovanovic, above n 32 at 24. 
49 Karl Marx cited in D Milovanovic, above n 32 at 23. 2+ 
50 Ibid. 
51 ID Balbus. above n 40 at 84-85, 
52 R Cotterrell, above n 2 at 150. 
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and centralized in specific institution (eg government bureaucracies) and processes. 
The modern state thus represents a distinct concentration of political power. It 
holds the monopoly of the means of violence and coercion and rule making." This 
particularly important historical development in human history occurred gradually 
in Western societies, especially in Europe. The nineteenth century social thinkers 
came to conceive of the separation of "state" and "civil society", that is, broadly 
speaking, the separation between on the one hand a "public" realm of government, 
politics and collective interest, and on the other, a "private" realm of individual 
interests and social relationships reflecting those interests, the private transactions 
based on the concept of private property and rights. A clear conception of the 
process was captured by Engels: 
The state is... by no means a power imposed on society from without; just as little 
is it'the reality of the moral ideas'... Rather it is a product of society at a particular 
stage of development: it is the admission that this society has involved itself in 
insoluble self-contradiction and is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is 
powerless to exorcise. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting 
economic interests shall not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, a 
power, apparently standing above society, has become necessary to moderate the 
conflict and keep it within the bounds of 'order'; and this power, arisen out of 
society but placing itself above it and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the 
state.5" 
As to the "reification" of the state, Marx described it in the following terms: 
[A state is a power] which has won an existence independent of the individuals...a 
social power... [which] appears to the individuals... not as their own united power, 
but as an alien force existing outside of them, of the origin and goal of which they 
are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, and which on the contrary passes 
through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action 
of men, may even being the prime governor of these." 
From the foregoing elaboration a point can be reiterated. With the separation of 
public and private spheres of life, or the "politics" and the "economy", becoming 
more pronounced, while the reach of the state extended to control an ever widening 
sector of social life, law not only appeared as inevitably standing apart from society 
but was in a position to "act" independently upon it as an external force. Such a 
conception becomes significant under capitalism for the protection of the capitalist 
mode of production and more so under present day monopoly capitalism, where 
the state actively intervenes in the economic sphere to overcome crisis tendencies,56 
As Klare declares, 
53 JA Hall and GJ Ikenberry, The Stale (Open University Press 1989) 2. 
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The state sets the ground rules of most economic transactions, directly regulates 
many significant industries, regulates the class struggle through labor laws, through 
its actions determines the size of 'social wage', provides the infrastructure of capital 
accumulation, manages the tempo of business activity and economic growth, takes 
measures directly to maintain effective demand, and itself participates in the market 
as a massive business actor and employer.57 
In reference to the Third World economies which are preoccupied with the 
fulfillment of "development" goals, such a task for the state and law does not only 
become necessary but their raison d'etre. "Nowhere," states Ghai et al, "has the 
instrumentalist conception of law been more widely used in the Third World than 
in the establishment of a multitude of public enterprises based on the idea that the 
balance between executive control and management autonomy is best achieved 
through law",JS Further points on the issue have also been highlighted by the 
economist, Harry G. Johnson, in his writing of "economic policies toward less 
developed countries". He concludes: 
To establish a modern society capable of self-sustaining growth at a reasonable rate 
requires, in broad cultural terms, the attainment of political stability and a reasonable 
impartiality of governmental administration, to provide a political institutional 
framework within which individuals and enterprises (whether working for their 
own gain or within the public sector) can plan innovations with maximum certainty 
about the future environment. It requires the establishment of a legal system defining 
rights of property, person and contract sufficiently clearly, and a judiciary system 
permitting settlement of disputes sufficiently predictably and inexpensively, to 
provide a legal institutional framework within which production and accumulation 
can be undertaken with a minimum degree of n on-economic risk. And it requires 
the establishment of a social system permitting mobility of all kinds (both allowing 
opportunity and recognizing accomplishment), and characterized by the 
depersonalization of economic and social relationships, to provide maximum 
opportunities and incentives for individual advancement on the basis of productive 
economic contribution.5' 
Adding to the economic imperatives for law's instrumentality is the modernization 
theory adopted by many of the Third World countries. The theory has a penchant 
for authoritarianism. The emphasis, therefore, is toward a strong state, order and 
stability. To this end, law is often viewed as having a central role to play. 
[Modernization theory has tended to conform more to the dictates of order and 
stability (that is, repression) than to liberal democracy... Modern law and modern 
legal education have rarely been seen to stand apart from this. On the contrary, law 
is often seen as rightly associated with the preservation of order ... any order ... 
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Gardner instances how legal education with 'progressive', instrumentalist emphasis 
produced efficient operatives for military dictatorship in Latin America ... *° 
In the light of the preceding discussion, a point can perhaps be made that the view 
expressed by Malaysia's Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir, on the necessity to utilise 
law in a development strategy, quoted at the beginning of this article, could well be 
understood from the perspective of law thus examined, that is, the conception of 
law as an autonomous entity in a state-regulated Third World capitalist economy. 
For it is in such a perspective that law becomes possible to be viewed principally 
as state-action and an instrument of government, freed from moral and cultural 
constraints, purified of normative values, consciously and rationally formulated 
and applied; and most importantly, it gathers an ontological status apparently 
external and apart from the society in which it exists. 
Conclusion 
In the present age of bureaucratised mass societies, where codification and 
legislation have become the principal sources of legitimate social regulation and 
control, it appears inevitable that the instrumentalist conception of the law will 
dominate legal discourses and all attempts to comprehend legal phenomena. This 
means that an adequate concept of law in the present epoch of human socio-
economic development must necessarily acknowledge law's "transcendent factity", 
its autonomous status within the society in which it stands. Moreover, it is this 
characteristic of law which today essentially distinguishes it from other forms of 
social regulation - customs, mores, usages, etc. 
However, caution must be exercised in such a conceptualization of the law in order 
that it does not become unacceptably reified. For otherwise it paves the way for 
the tyranny of the legal form which only serves to conceal, mask and mystify 
many of law's "dysfunctional" traits in a human collective life - as instrument of 
power and repression, as a tool of mass ideological conditioning, in legitimisation 
oforder and domination which deepens individuals' alienation and their dependency 
on the state power, and in perpetuating the hallowed and symbolic rights, of freedom 
and liberty for citizens. As observed by the nineteenth-century novelist Anatole 
France, in his eloquent but cynical remark: "The majestic equality of the law,,, 
forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal 
bread." What this, in turn, calls for is a constant awareness, especially on the part 
of legal scholars and jurists, of law's anchorage in the "material conditions of 
life", wherein resides the brute fact of human historical process through incessant 
struggles and from which law draws much of it force and essence. 
60 PFtapatrick, ibid at 49, 
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